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Abstract
 This paper examines the power and limitations of historical analysis in regards to 
explaining the Holocaust and in particular the widespread consent to the Nazi program. One of 
the primary limitations that emerges is an inability of historians to fully engage other social 
sciences to offer a more comprehensive explanation as to why so many Germans engaged in 
what we would consider an “evil” enterprise. In that regard, I offer the work of Ernest Becker, a 
social anthropologist, whose work provides a framework for understanding history as a 
succession of attempts by man to create societies that generate meaning through various heroic 
quests that defy man’s finite existence, yet often result in carnage.  Combining Becker’s 
theoretical framework with the rich historical evidence specific to the Holocaust provides a much 
richer understanding of both Becker’s work and why the Holocaust happened. 
Keywords: Ernest Becker, Holocaust, Otto Rank, Escape From Evil, Denial of Death, 
immortality project, explaining evil 
iii
1Introduction
 The Holocaust was a watershed in modernity. Highly educated Germany, one of the most 
“enlightened” and “civilized’ Western  powers at the time, mobilized all the machinery at the 
disposal of a mid-twentieth century state, including many of its technocrats, bureaucrats, 
military, education, medical, transportation and even its artistic community, on its own heroic, 
racial mission, which included the quest to exterminate Jews everywhere in the world - and 
almost succeeded.1  Perhaps not surprising is the number of scholars who explicitly or implicitly 
support the view that this mobilization was outside the normal flow of history, an anomaly, 
precipitated by an evil madman and his small group of henchmen. As Zygmunt Bauman 
described in the preface to his book, Modernity and the Holocaust:
Like most of my colleagues, I assumed that the Holocaust was, at best, something to be 
illuminated by us social scientists, but certainly not something that can illuminate the 
objects of our current concerns. I believed (by default rather than by deliberation) that the 
Holocaust was an interruption in the normal flow of history, a cancerous growth on the 
body of civilized society, a momentary madness among sanity. Thus I could paint for the 
use of my students a picture of normal, healthy, sane society, leaving the story of the 
Holocaust to the professional pathologists.2
Bauman metaphorically describes the classical view of the Holocaust as a picture, neatly framed 
to set the painting apart from the wallpaper and the other furnishings, in essence holding it 
distinct from its surroundings. Bauman’s exploration of some of the reasons that there has been a 
tendency to cordon off the Holocaust from an analysis of contemporary society hints at some of 
the limitations inherent in traditional historical analysis. Yet he is also effusive in his appreciation 
1 The question of whether the Third Reich was “modern” is not the primary issue here, though one that has stirred 
considerable debate. In The Racial State, Germany 1933-1945, Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann 
contend that to call the Third Reich “modern” is absurd, a relativistic construction that masks the truly unique racial 
nature of the Nazis. My point is simply that Nazi Germany emanated from one of the  leading Western powers at the 
time and mobilized all facets of its society in its mission. 
2 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000),  viii.
2for the work of  historians over the last twenty years. “The evidence amassed by the historians 
was overwhelming in volume and content. Their analyses were cogent and profound. They 
showed beyond reasonable doubt that the Holocaust was a window, rather than a picture on the 
wall...”3 
 Bauman’s apparent ambivalence towards past scholarly approaches to the Holocaust is at 
the heart of this work. Even with such an incredible volume of work, there have been 
considerable limitations and factors which have impacted the historiography of the Holocaust. 
My approach is to examine one of many intriguing central questions regarding the Holocaust, 
why was there such widespread consent to the Nazi program, and comment on the power and 
limitations of historical analysis. This work posits that the historians have done a brilliant job 
documenting the nature and pervasiveness of consent, but are limited in explaining why. One of 
the primary limitations of historical analysis that emerges is an inability to engage other social 
sciences to offer a more comprehensive explanation of why so many Germans engaged in what 
we would consider an “evil” enterprise. In that regard, I offer the work of Ernest Becker, a social 
anthropologist, whose work some have described as offering a “science of evil”. Becker attempts 
to explain the phenomenon of evil, without invoking theological constructions, though his work 
is predominately theoretical and lacking in example.  Becker offers a new interpretation of 
history as a non-teleological succession of attempts by man to create societies that generate 
meaning through various heroic quests that defy man’s finite existence. In pursuit of these heroic 
quests, which represent man’s yearning for power, meaning, or immortality, in this instance 
interchangeable goals, man creates societies that are willing to make any sacrifice that threaten 
3 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, viii.
3their overall project, and as a result great carnage can result. The Nazis provided one such heroic 
quest in their vision for a racially pure Volk, and the thousand year Reich. Though he won a 
Pulitzer Prize for his 1973 book, The Denial of Death, Becker’s work has been largely ignored 
by historians. The combination of Becker’s theoretical framework with the rich evidence recently  
produced by historians provides a much richer understanding of why the Holocaust happened. 
 This work is divided into four chapters. Chapter one attempts to explain how historians 
have limited their field of inquiry in their examination of the Holocaust which has constrained 
their ability to offer explanations as to why it happened. Chapter two outlines other basic 
limitations in Holocaust historiography. Chapter three briefly describes where the historians 
shine in documenting the degree of consent to the Nazi program. Chapter four is a brief 
examination of Ernest Becker’s work which following the other sections demonstrates by its 
quick summation how it might be powerfully used in conjunction with historical analysis to 
overcome some of the limitations described and offer a deeper explanation of why the Holocaust 
happened. 
4Chapter 1 : Historians’ Limited Perspective On Explaining “Why?”
 Considering the question of German consent, an impartial jury examining the evidence 
unearthed by historians would be able to reach a verdict with a fair amount of confidence, a 
testament to the power of historical evidence. They could hear expert testimony from Raul 
Hilberg on the the mobilization of a vast bureaucracy that involved a wide cross-section of 
Germans, Robert Proctor on how the medical profession, part of the intellectual elite, led the 
racial charge, Omer Bartov on how there was widespread support in the Wehrmacht for Hitler’s 
racial vision, and Christopher Browning on how typical Germans became killers under the Nazis 
without a great deal of direct coercion, among many other potential witnesses. There is not an 
unequivocal answer, of course, but reading many of the specialists and their evidence, one senses 
that there is at least a strong potential that many Germans were drawn to the Nazi message, not 
coerced, not even just passive. With that possibility the natural next question is why, and on this 
score, historians are relatively silent. Not totally silent, Hilberg certainly addressed the power of 
the bureaucracy, the banality of evil, with its compartments, distancing and inducements to 
repress; Bartov discussed the Fuhrer cult among the soldiers; and Browning attempted to explain 
normal men becoming killers referencing Zimbardo’s Stanford prison experiments and the 
importance of situational factors, along with Milgram’s famous experiments on authority, and the 
allure of conformity amidst potentially deadly isolation. Yet these explanations are relegated to 
final chapters, afterwords, or commentary not fully developed. For quite some time after the war, 
the conventional wisdom was that the German people had a special disposition to authority that 
5compelled them to follow orders, hardly comprehensive (though that was the explanation my 
father, a WWII veteran provided when asked).4  
 This silence from historians is understandable, perhaps, as this question tackles broader 
issues of man’s motivations and in a post-Freudian world, many would claim that those 
motivations are often not clearly known even by the players.  So how is a historian equipped to 
develop evidence regarding motivation; where are the archives that reveal men’s cultish 
attractions? Certainly, historians’ examinations of diaries is illuminating, and one of the primary 
sources for Omer Bartov’s influential work, Hitler’s Army was his analysis of soldiers’ diaries 
and letters to glean their views of the Reich, but there remains the problem of the soldiers’ degree 
of self-awareness.5  One of the most fascinating approaches is Claudia Koonz’ attempt to trace 
the historical development of a special Nazi conscience, a cross between nationalism and 
religious fundamentalistic devotion that the Nazis, and Hitler in particular, attempted to 
inculcate. Koonz begins her work with the assumption that many Germans were drawn to the 
Nazi program and then develops her evidence of how that transpired. After previewing her 
theory in the first introductory chapter, she began her book with the provocative, “Although it 
may strain credulity to conceive of Adolf Hitler as a prophet of virtue, therein lies the secret of 
his immense popularity.”6 Koonz is so interesting because she documented the circumstances 
and attraction of Nazism, much as one would chronicle the rise of a new religion. 
4 This theory was greedily accepted by a public searching for explanations that absolved themselves, according to 
Bauman.  Theodore Adorno and the Frankfurt School’s publication of The Authoritarian Personality immediately 
after the war, which located the problem of the Holocaust with this special personality that was susceptible to 
authority was as shallow an interpretation as William Goldhagen’s explanation in his more recent best seller, Hitler’s 
Willing Executioners that the Germans had a special anti-semitism.
5As an interesting side-note, two of the most prominent early Hitler biographers, Hugh Trevor-Roper and Alan 
Bulloch expressed their disdain for psychohistory, due to its lack of clear evidence, a related problem. 
6 Claudia Koonz, The Nazi Conscience (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 17.
6 Koonz aside, many historians have answered the question posed earlier regarding 
motivations and passions with silence.  No direct historical evidence, no archives, no comment. 
In regards to the Holocaust, that abdication has the repercussion of creating the paradox Bauman 
alluded to. Much of the popular historiography of the Holocaust presents the Holocaust as a 
tragic other-worldly event, outside the normal current of history, while historians continue to 
present some incredibly creative and detailed analyses on the mobilization of most segments of 
German society around the Nazi program. 
 One solution is for historians to embrace other disciplines and incorporate these into their 
work, or for other specialists to embrace some of the powerful analytical methods of historians. 
Robert Jay Lifton is a psychiatrist by background that wrote a penetrating study of medical 
killing under the Nazis, The Nazi Doctors - Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide. His 
book includes case studies of several Nazi doctors, including extensive interviews with many of 
them, and rich historical evidence of how these otherwise unremarkable doctors were socialized 
to an ideology of “therapeutic killing”. He chronicled the “problem” that confronted Nazi 
technocrats was that shooting men, women and children in the back of the neck tended to 
demoralize the Einsatzgruppen. Their “creative” solution, the death camp, distanced the 
executioner from the victim. Lifton interviewed a neuropsychiatrist who treated a large number 
of these “killer troops”, as the doctor described them, who developed symptoms, most notably 
related to shooting children, such as an severe anxiety, nightmares, tremors and various bodily 
complaints, which he described as similar to combat reactions of other troops though, “he 
estimated that 20 percent associated their symptoms mainly with the unpleasantness of what they  
7had to do...”7 The Nazis’ awareness of such psychological difficulties and their search for a more 
“surgical” method of killing is well known, according to Lifton, but he says, “But there is 
another perspective on medicalized killing that I believe to be insufficiently recognized: killing 
as a therapeutic imperative.”8  He quotes survivor/physician Dr. Ella Lingens-Reiner who 
pointed at the smokestack in Auschwitz and asked Nazi doctor Fritz Klein: 
How can you reconcile that with your {Hippocratic} oath as a doctor?
His answer was, “Of course I am a doctor and I want to preserve life. And out of respect for 
human life, I would remove a gangrenous appendix from a diseased body. The Jew is the 
gangrenous appendix in the body of mankind.”9
Lifton goes on to quote Hitler in Mein Kampf, “Anyone who wants to cure this era, which is 
inwardly sick and rotten, must first of all summon up the courage to make clear the causes of the 
disease.”10  For Hitler the disease became the Jews, and of course, this was not just figurative 
language.  As Hitler told Himmler in his famous Table Talks, published by Hughes Trevor-Roper:
The discovery of the Jewish virus is one of the greatest revolutions that have taken place 
in the world. The battle in which we are engaged today is of the same sort as the battle 
waged, during the last century, by Pasteur and Koch. How many diseases have their 
origin in the Jewish virus...We shall regain our health only by eliminating the Jew.11
How the Nazis categorized the Jews as a cancer or a virus that should be eliminated has been 
extremely well documented. Within our own current frameworks, we think of this as figurative 
language, yet Lifton documents the literalness with which the Nazis equated Jews to disease.  
7 Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors, Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 
2000), 15.
8 Ibid., 15.
9 Ibid., 16.
10 Ibid., 17.
11 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 71.
8Lifton’s background, his familiarity and willingness to address the theories of why that imagery 
was realized, not just rhetorical, and its hold in the medical community, support a richer analysis 
of the Nazi state and how medicine was corrupted in the creation of what he terms, a “biocracy.” 
“The model here is a theocracy, a system of rule by priests of a sacred order under the claim of 
divine prerogative. In the case of the Nazi biocracy, the divine prerogative  was that of cure 
through purification and revitalization of the Aryan race...”12 Language, like society, is a 
symbolic creation and Lifton shows the Nazi corruption of both. He also offered a compelling 
analysis of the motivations of genocide near the end of the book, after first examining the 
corruption of doctors and the Nazi vision, which he describes as, “a vision of absolute control 
over the evolutionary process, over the biological human future.”13
 Lifton’s theories on Genocide, which included analyzing the appeal of Nazism for many 
Germans, are provocative and parallel in many ways to the work of Ernest Becker.  The more 
general point  is that Lifton accessed historical analysis, psychological theory, and sociology to 
powerful effect. One is also left with the distinct possibility, but certainly not proof, that a 
broader examination of the  Holocaust, employing deeper penetration into the motivational 
appeal of the Third Reich, yields a more frighteningly familiar phenomenon. As Lifton 
concluded an interview with a successful Jewish dentist who had been forced to remove gold 
fillings from the teeth of gassed fellow Jews in Auschwitz, the dentist said looking around at the 
beautiful, lush gardens surrounding his veranda, “The world is not this world.” And Lifton 
remarks, “What I think he meant was that after Auschwitz, the ordinary rhythms and appearances 
12 Lifton, The Nazi Doctors, 17.
13 Ibid.
9of life, however innocuous or pleasant, were far from the truth of human existence.”14 Said 
another way, Bauman comments that, “like it or not, Auschwitz expands the universe of 
consciousness no less than landing on the moon.”15
14 Ibid., 3. 
15 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 11.
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Chapter 2:  Further Limitations to Holocaust Historiography
 Holocaust historiography exposes the potential politicization of historical interpretation, 
if not through explicit state pressure, then at least through public pressure and the influence of 
scholars’ own self-image and views of man’s nature.  Omer Bartov argued that in the aftermath 
of the war, “Germans saw themselves as victims of destruction, perpetuated on them both by 
Hitler and by his enemies.”16 Part of the challenge of dealing with genocide is the inability of the 
perpetrators to view themselves as evil. Bartov posited that the Germans immediately 
disassociated themselves with Hitler and the now dreaded Nazi – who ironically, became an 
elusive evil perpetrator, just as Nazis had portrayed the Jew. Now the Nazi was the “un-German” 
outsider. As the society rebuilt itself and West Germany allied with the West in the Cold War, this 
image enabled “Germany to forge a new identity both related to its past and cleansed of 
responsibility for its crimes.”17 This new identity impacted the writing of history after the war, 
downplaying the degree of consent prevalent in German society for the Nazi program. The 
popular image became that Hitler and his henchman were responsible for genocide and those that 
perpetrated atrocious acts were either following orders without full knowledge of their impact, 
under tremendous coercion from evil Nazis, or defending Germany in a time of war from the 
ravages of the Russians. Few were willing to address the possibility that an entire Western 
society was complicit in genocide.  Hanna Arendt, a victim of the Holocaust, said in the 1950’s 
that an, “iron band of terror held Germany in its grip,” but as Claudia Koonz points out, “archival 
16 Omer Bartov, Social Outcasts in War and Genocide, in Social Outsiders in Nazi Germany, edited by Robert 
Gellately and Nathan Stoltzfus (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 300.
17 Bartov. Outcasts in War and Genocide,  300.
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research of the 1990’s cast doubt on the omnipotence of terror and propaganda…Not mindless 
obedience but selective compliance characterized Germans’ collaboration with evil.”18 
 Shortly after he published The Last Days of Hitler in 1947, Hugh Tevor-Roper received a 
death threat from the Stern Gang, a underground Zionist guerrilla group that succeeded in 
assassinating Mideast mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte. Ron Rosenbaum writes in Explaining 
Hitler, that The Last Days was one of the most famous and influential of the Hitler biographies, 
and it was certainly one of the first.19 The background of  its publication, including the 
subsequent death threat, revealed the stakes and pressures of Holocaust scholarship. According to 
Rosenbaum, in September of 1945 Soviet officials, at the direct orders from Stalin, began to 
spread the lie that Hitler was still alive and being hidden in the British zone of occupation.20 Dick 
White, then Deputy Director of MI6, sent Hugh Trevor-Roper to meticulously document the final 
months, days and minutes of Hitler’s time in the bunker. Trevor-Roper interviewed all the 
officers that were there in the bunker, including those that soaked Hitler’s dead body in kerosene 
and set it on fire. It was also during this time that Trevor-Roper discovered Hitler’s famous final 
testament, in which Hitler extorts his followers to continue the war on “Jewish world poisoners”, 
before he killed himself.21 What is significant is that even in one of the first, influential 
biographies of Hitler, British intelligence exerted influence.
18 Koonz, Nazi Conscience, 13. 
19 Ron Rosenbaum, Explaining Hitler (New York: Random House, 1998.), 63.
20 Ibid., 64.
21 Ibid. 
12
 The death threat illustrates the stakes of Holocaust explanations. Trevor-Roper has been 
criticized for his description of Hitler’s genius, his ability to almost mesmerize others. His 
overdone language included:
Hitler had the eyes of a hypnotist which seduced the wits and affections of all who yielded 
to their power...This personal magnetism remained with him to the end; and only by 
reference to it can we explain the extraordinary obedience which he still commanded in the 
last week of his life, when all the machinery of force and persuasion had disappeared... and 
only his personality remained.22 
The Stern Gang objected to Trevor-Roper “immortalizing” Hitler.  Rosenbaum points out how 
ironic it is that Trevor-Roper contributed to the Hitler myth, including the belief that Hitler, the 
evil hypnotic genius, was alive somewhere, when his purpose on behalf of British intelligence 
was exactly the opposite.23 Also evident from the start were indirect attempts to explain the 
allure of Nazism, which the Hitler myth also tapped. 
 Early after the war, much of the historiography was a battle over the various biographies 
of Hitler. Alan Bullock released Hitler, A Study in Tyranny in 1952 and immediately galvanized 
critics with his portrait of Hitler as “an opportunist who was solely concerned with acquiring 
power.”24 Trevor-Roper was convinced, as he stated in an interview with Rosenbaum, that 
“Hitler was convinced of his own rectitude.”25 This question of whether Hitler truly believed in 
his mission was furiously debated. While this is an interesting question, it is significant that in 
the early decades after the war so much debate and discussion centered on Hitler and his beliefs - 
to some extent avoiding the question of general consent, and of course, guilt. This debate also 
22 Ibid., 66.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., 69.
25 Ibid.
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immediately enraged many who thought that the opportunist portrait of Hitler somehow lessened 
the significance of the extermination of the Jews as being the centerpiece of the Holocaust.26 
 Another limiting factor of Holocaust historiography is that for many it is seen as Jewish 
property. Bauman rightly points out that the Holocaust is a Jewish tragedy, but its victims were 
certainly not limited to Jews and some of its implications are lost when limited to this more 
narrow perception, certainly the discourse is restricted. He describes this “ownership” view as a 
widely held belief that the Holocaust was: 
a tragedy that occurred to the Jews and the Jews alone...Time and again it had been narrated 
by Jews and non-Jews alike as a collective (and sole) property of the Jews, as something to 
be left to, or jealously guarded by, those who escaped shooting and the gassing, and by the 
descendants of the shot and the gassed...Some self-appointed spokesmen for the dead went 
as far as warning against thieves who collude to steal the Holocaust from the Jews, 
christianize it, or just dissolve its uniquely Jewish character in the misery of an indistinct 
humanity.27
 It is important to draw distinctions to aid in understanding, but the intensity of the debate 
over the degree of the Holocaust’s “uniqueness” reflects the loaded emotional and political 
significance embedded in the topic and at some point is a distraction to its other implications. 
Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg point this out when they state, “in a bizarre twist the very 
uniqueness of the Holocaust, on which most historians have insisted, and with which we agree, 
has militated against drawing the unlearned lessons of this event.”28 Yehuda Bauer founded the 
International Center for the Study of Antisemitism at Hebrew University, and is an esteemed 
26 This naturally leads to the continuing fervor in the debate between the “internationalists” and the “functionalists”.  
There are quite a number of Holocaust scholars still pre-occupied in proving the exact minute Hitler, or the Nazi 
functionaries below him, reached their decision(s) on the Final Solution. 
27 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, viii.
28 Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, “The Unlearned Lessons of the Holocaust,” Modern Judaism 13.2 (1993): 
178. 
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scholar who has written eight or nine books on the Holocaust, yet in his most recent re-appraisal 
of his own work, Rethinking the Holocaust, Henry Friedlander points out, “Bauer’s central 
argument, covering the first five chapters, deals with the way the Holocaust should be defined. 
Bauer has always insisted on the uniqueness of the Holocaust, and that it involved the murder of 
the Jews and of no one else.”29 Such a preoccupation with the boundaries of definition are at 
least suspicious of other interests than merely drawing distinctions in the quest for knowledge. 
 For many, the Holocaust has become a specialist topic of Jewish history, complete with 
an entire world of specialists. Bauman contends that these specialists have produced some 
impressive work, but it rarely finds its way into the mainstream and in some ways works to 
isolate the discussion. As with the criticism of the deepening specialization in history, the 
Holocaust specialists are seen to increasingly develop a dialogue among themselves.30 As he 
states in the preface to his book:
And so we see that while the volume, depth and scholarly quality of specialist works in 
Holocaust history grow at an impressive pace, the amount of space and attention devoted to 
it in general accounts of modern history does not; if anything, it is easier now to be excused 
from a substantive analysis of the Holocaust by appending a respectably long list of 
scholarly references.31
 Edward O. Wilson in his book Consilience, made a strong case for greater integration of 
the social sciences (and the physical sciences). The isolation and limitations to the general 
dialogue from increasing specialization, replete with separate experts, conferences and jargon are 
well known. David Cannadine warns in the preface to his collection, What is History Now?:
29 Henry Friedlander, "Review: Yehuda Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust,"  American Historical Review Apr. 2003:  
481.
30 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, viii.
31 Ibid, xi.
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So much history is now being written that very few scholars can keep up with more than 
a tiny fraction of what is being published; all of us know more and more about less and 
less. The rise of so many sub-specialties threatens to produce a sort of sub-disciplinary 
chauvinism, where some practitioners insistently assert the primacy of their approach to 
the past and show little sympathy with, or knowledge of, other approaches.32
 Some political factions of Israel have tried to use the Holocaust for the purposes of 
promoting certain state interests. In Israel’s Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood, Idith 
Zertal devoted a chapter, “From the People’s Hall to the Wailing Wall,” which chronicled how 
Ben Gurion created a spectacle out of the Eichmann trial in order to mobilize memories of the 
Holocaust to further Israeli interests and demonize its Arab enemies. He also wanted to claim 
ownership of the Holocaust for Israel, when he commented on the trial that it, “is not so much 
the punishment of a particularly odious criminal, as the exposure of a sacred experience in the 
history of Israel.”33 With the publicity of the trial, Ben Gurion attempted to link certain Arab 
leaders to the Nazis and use the Holocaust to provide greater scope and legitimacy for any 
aggressive actions on its part. As Zertal summarized, Ben Guiron attempted to define that, “the 
dangers which Israel confronted and still confronts are Nazis in essence and scope, and any 
military threat or apparent threat to Israel means another Holocaust.”34
 Explaining the Holocaust as a manifestation of some unique German personality, culture, 
path, or brand of anti-semitism, has been largely discredited by most of the respected scholars in 
the field, but Daniel Goldhagen’s book, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, has been immensely 
popular and illustrative of the forces on Holocaust historiography. With great fanfare, supported 
32 David Cannadine, ed. What is History Now? (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), xi.
33 Idith Zertal, Israel’s Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  2005),
120.
34 Ibid., 114. 
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by the marketing muscle of Knopf, Goldhagen claimed to have “solved” the problem of the 
Holocaust. He claimed the Germans possessed some special anti-Semitism that could be traced 
through German history throughout the nineteenth century. He claimed that by the time Hitler 
came to power, the racial anti-Semitism of Germany was already “pregnant with murder.”35 
Dismissing Hilberg and Arendt’s banality of evil (and hardly acknowledging much of the 
decades of scholarship preceding him) Goldhagen claimed that the German people wanted to kill 
the Jews; Hitler in this explanation, for example, was hardly necessary.
 Rosenbaum discussed the “scholarly wilding” Goldhagen received from scholars 
immediately after publication when he and a panel addressed his book at the U.S. Holocaust 
Memorial Museum. The proceedings began with a letter from Hilberg, who Rosenbaum 
described as normally mild mannered, who wrote, “I take exception to Goldhagen’s thesis, which 
is worthless, all the hype from Knopf notwithstanding.” Yehuda Bauer, who was spending a year 
as a fellow at the museum, followed and cited all the historical work that Goldhagen ignored, 
which showed that Germany was not the most anti-Semitic country. He dismissed Goldhagen’s 
book as the work of shoddy research of a below average graduate student and then berated 
Harvard and its history department for doing such a poor job of training its students!
 There was certainly an element of resentment at Goldhagen’s instant bestsellerdom, but 
he was not helped by his arrogant claims to have solved the mystery of the Holocaust with a 
poorly supported, simplistic explanation and “in the packaging of unremarkable ideas into 
mainstream marketability as some dazzling, breakthrough reconception of the past.”36 Zygmut 
Bauman took great pains to examine and attack Goldhagen’s book because he believed this 
35 Rosenbaum, Explaining Hitler,  339.
36 Ibid., 341.
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manifesto tracing the Holocaust almost exclusively to an evil, demonic German people was 
distracting from the Holocaust’s wider implications. He believed that this type of argument is 
part of cordoning off the discourse since it relegated the Holocaust to having been a German 
problem. More interestingly, he analyzed why Goldhagen’s book has been so popular with such 
obvious flaws, which he attributed to the political interests of maintaing Jewish solidarity. He 
quotes Tom Segev of the Israeli daily Haaretz as being right on target when he wrote:
The Jewish establishment embraced Goldhagen as if he was Mr. Holocaust in person. This 
is absurd, since the critiques raised against Goldhagen are well founded... This is 
nevertheless understandable since what is at stake is the “Zionist character” of Goldhagen’s 
thesis. What truly matters in the end, “not just the Germans but all Gentiles hate the Jews.” 
Hence also the need of ever more numerous books on anti-Jewish hatred, and the more 
simplistic and superficial they are, the better.37
 While there may be many other limitations and interests which have limited the 
historiography of the Holocaust, one last obvious limitation is the stereotyping so easily 
accomplished through Hollywood. As Bauman pointed out, most depictions of the Third Reich 
somewhat understandably depict all Nazis as revolting, degenerate, sadistic monsters marching 
“upright, dignified, and morally unscathed, doctors and their families (just like your Brooklyn 
neighbors) to the gas chambers... These images pleasantly resonate with public mythology,”38 
and as a result a deeper understanding may be lost.  
37 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust,  243.
38 Ibid., ix.
18
Chapter 3: The Historians’ Strength - Documenting Consent to the Nazi Program
 There is a compelling mass of evidence, much of it the result of relatively recent 
scholarship, attesting to the high degree of consent in support of the Nazi program. That does not 
imply that there were not pockets of resistance or that there was not significant terror imposed by  
the Nazi regime. The Nazis certainly exerted terror tactics, establishing an elaborate 
concentration camp system for the enemies of society that they specifically made public. But 
similar themes run throughout a number of influential works that paint a picture of Nazi 
Germany as a community recreated out of the defeat of WWI, the perceived disgrace of 
Versailles, the economic turmoil of the Depression and the anxiety of modernity, into a 
community of shared Nazi values. These books primarily address how this was achieved, all 
making the point to different degrees that Germany was not on a special path that led to 
Auschwitz, rather the Nazis transformed society in their glorious quest of a racially pure Volk, 
which much like Ahab’s mission, destroyed all it touched. 
 Claudia Koonz is unequivocal in her belief that most Germans were aware of what was 
happening. She quotes a Viennese journalist who wrote in 1947:
The methodicalness of the killing must certainly have become visible even to the totally 
blind...There is no doubt whatsoever that there was not a single person in Germany who did 
not know that the Jews were being harmed. In bomb shelters, Germans’ awareness of their 
culpability emerged in anxieties that bombardments were reprisals and in fears that  
invading Soviet troops would wreak savage vengeance. Knowledge about genocide was 
available to anyone who cared to find it.39
In The Nazi Conscience Claudia Koonz attempted to show the appeal of the new Nazi 
“morality”. She stressed the positive draw Nazism held for many Germans and  argued against 
39 Koonz, The Nazi Conscience, 269.
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the notion that Germans supported Hitler simply because of a sense of hopelessness resulting 
from massive unemployment, inflation, the loss of the war and fear of modernity and change, so 
well analyzed by Peukert in The Weimar Republic. While Koonz acknowledged that this 
backdrop certainly set the stage for Hitler, she argued that Nazism, as an ideology, provided 
“answers to life’s imponderables, provided meaning in the face of contingency…It also defined 
good and evil, condemning self-interest as immoral and enshrining altruism as virtue.”40 
More specifically, Koonz described how Nazism coupled aspects of religious fanaticism 
with the appeal of ethnic nationalism in a term she defines as “ethnic fundamentalism”. While 
she described this in detail, her concept is that Nazism had a religious basis in that it “claimed to 
defend an ancient spiritual heritage against the corrosive values of industrialized, urban 
society”41  As Ian Kershaw demonstrated in his biography of Hitler, one of the basic themes 
running throughout all of Hitler’s speeches is his vision of an idyllic, rural pure German Volk – 
which modern society and World Jewry were attempting to destroy. In this racial conception, the 
very salvation of Germany was at stake – thus the very religious, Armageddon-like images he 
used, where immortality in terms of the future of all German people was in jeopardy. As Koonz 
described in her book, Hitler played the part of the evangelical preacher where one’s soul is at 
stake.  Kershaw also detailed the emotional aspects of Hitler’s speeches and discussed how the 
staging of the mass rallies evoked religious settings, with Hitler at the alter.  The emotional 
appeal was so strong because the stakes were set so high – one’s immortal future in heaven or 
hell, or in this case, the survival of German people. This brinksmanship was reminiscent of the 
justification of the burning of heretics, done to preserve the heretics’ immortal soul and protect 
40 Ibid., 2.
41 Ibid., 13.
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the community from eternal corruption. Against the stakes of immortality, what is the burning of 
one person? This is similar reasoning to the medical professions’ acceptance of  “therapeutic 
killing”, contradicting all their medical training, that Lifton explored.   
In describing these aspects of the appeal of Nazism, these historians unwittingly 
documented key aspects of Becker’s theory. Becker, as will be explored in Chapter 4, explained 
man’s innate longing for immortality, a symbolic need for meaning which was often manifest in 
“heroic” quests. Morality, according to Becker, is not innate, rather man creates culture, religion, 
art, civilization, in an attempt to give his life meaning, as an expression of power and then these 
death defying symbols become all important. In the chaos, confusion, disappointment and 
frustration of Weimar Germany, the Nazis provided the people a vision of a glorious future.42 For 
Becker, the Germans, or any people, will sacrifice or kill any perceived enemy to “save their 
soul,” another way of saying for their own vision of immortality. 
In the new Nazi morality, Koonz described how virtue became redefined as the strength 
to destroy ones enemies even when they were disguised as the innocent. Individual rights paled 
against the salvation of the Volk, the individual’s highest function was to further this racial 
vision. Accordingly, in this new morality, all outsiders were isolated and destroyed. Civil society 
was stripped away and reduced to this singular cause. 
The ethnic portion of Koonz’ definition “summons followers to seek vengeance for past 
wrongs and to forge a glorious future cleansed of ethnic aliens.”43 Nationalistic appeals have a 
similar, powerful appeal as the religious, yet the term is really as elusive as the concept of race. 
42 Eric Voegelin similarly attempted to describe the crisis of modernity in the fifth volume of his series, History and 
Order, how when man creates his own path to salvation, in substitution for God’s transcendental purpose and the 
humbleness that implies, he will kill the entire world to save his soul. 
43 Ibid.
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In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson defined nations as imagined political 
communities, imagined because a member of the community can hardly know the rest of the 
community, but there is a sense of shared history, culture, language and memory. And the 
community is limited, which implies a difference of us versus them. The Nazi’s certainly created 
a vision of a common, imagined community, with imagined enemies threatening their 
destruction, but their imagined ethnic community was defined by race. Anderson’s chapter, 
Patriotism and Racism was an examination of the subtleties of nationalism versus racism and an 
attempt to answer a question posed at the beginning of his work, “Why people are willing to die 
for these inventions?”44 For Anderson, nationalism implied a historical destiny, while racism 
“dreams of eternal contamination, transmitted from the origins of time through an endless 
sequence of loathsome copulations: outside history.”45 Brain Porter echoes this sentiment in 
When Nationalism Began to Hate. He states, “the locating and relocating of the nation within 
time, and eventually (fatally) outside of time, made it possible for nationalism to begin to hate.”46 
Koonz contends that Nazism appealed to both nationalistic and religious conceptions of a shared 
community, created outside the normal historical progression, appealing to powerful, emotional 
ideologies of identity and immortality. Becker’s work  addressed the dynamics of these creations 
of identity and meaning in great detail, which is why it is applicable to understanding the 
Holocaust. 
Ian Kershaw chronicled Hitler’s rise to power, and though not his primary intention, 
documented his widespread support as he addressed Hiler’s appeal and the creation of the 
44 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 
1991), 141.
45 Ibid., 149.
46 Brian Porter, When Nationalism Began to Hate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.), 9.
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“Fuhrer Cult.” He explained that conceptions of “heroic” leadership were part of the culture of 
the right, which disdained the Social Democrats, parliamentary government, and Weimar’s 
perceived effeminate ineffectiveness, still associated with German impotency and humiliation. 
Resonating with Protestant middle class and romantic intellectuals, and harkening back to 
grandiose images of Imperial grandeur, the idea of a heroic leader who would lead Germany out 
of its morass became vested in Hitler. 47 As Kershaw points out:
 the devastating war and the subsequent “idealization of the “community of fate” in the 
trenches and the “great deeds” and heroism of “true leadership” in the struggle for 
national survival – undermined, according to the legend, from within – provided a mass 
of new potential adherents to the coming of a “great leader” and the Nazi vision.48 
Within the Protestant Church, there were many, according to Kershaw, that were looking 
for a great Leader to bring about “spiritual and moral revival,” someone to re-invoke “true 
Christian values.”49  Likewise, Bartov traced the almost fanatical, semi-religious belief in Hitler 
that was a prominent part of Nazi propaganda aimed at the soldiers combined with a 
demonization of the Eastern hordes. As he states, “the Fuhrer was thus presented as the creator of 
the new German nation and guardian of its ancient traditions, its source of power and prosperity, 
of fertility and purity.”50
Hitler and the Nazi’s exploited this yearning, often contrasting the leaderless democracy 
of Weimar with the concept of the true heroic leader, a man born to destiny, not bound by 
conventional rules and laws, “embodying the will of God” who would lead the Volk to salvation. 
47 Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936 Hubris (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998.), 180.
48 Ibid., 181.
49 Ibid.
50 Omar Bartov, Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992), 
 125.
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“Devotion, loyalty, obedience and duty were the corresponding values demanded from 
followers”51 – which was part of Hitler’s call for glory and sacrifice. Becker in his work Escape 
from Evil quotes Hegel, “Men create evil out of good intentions, not out of wicked ones.”52 
Koonz likewise states in her work, “The road to Auschwitz was paved with righteousness.”53   
In Racial Hygiene, Robert Proctor examined how the medical community actively  
served the needs of the Nazis by legitimizing their racial science. As Michael Foucault examined, 
all ideologies are about power relationships. He contended that the structure of society is really 
about serving those in power.  Though many consider science objective and value-free, Proctor 
showed in this thorough examination of how many in the medical community mobilized around 
Nazi theories of race and eugenics, and served the regime. They not only followed Hitler, 
according to Proctor, they led the way. “Physicians, and the body of intellectuals associated with 
them, did not follow blindly, but actually helped cast the light to clear the path.”54
Robert Gellately in Backing Hitler, Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany made clear 
that the Nazis did not need to use coercion, they cultivated public opinion and the new society 
enforced the ideology. The regime conducted public executions, with no protest, people were 
well informed of the extensive camp system and supported such law and order tactics.  As he 
stated in his conclusion:
The Nazis did not need to use widespread terror against the population to establish the 
regime…Many Germans went along, not because they were mindless robots, but because 
51 Kershaw, Hitler, 182.
52 Ernest Becker, Escape From Evil (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 151. 
53 Koonz, The Nazi Conscience,  2.
54 Robert Proctor, Racial Hygiene, Medicine Under the Nazis (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1988), 289.
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they convinced themselves of Hitler’s advantages and the “positive” sides of the new 
dictatorship.55
His methodology included an extensive analysis of media reports in regards to the rapid 
expansion of concentration camps showing the degree of public knowledge.  He searched 
existing police records to determine the extent to which the Gestapo originated arrests with the 
statistical conclusion that the Gestapo was spread exceedingly thin and that citizens were 
responsible for initiating the majority of police actions and persecutions. He also examined how 
political opposition became synonymous with criminal acts, and public support for persecuting 
both, through analysis of the court system, media reports, and very public news releases 
regarding concentration camps. 
  Raul Hilberg, in his three volume masterpiece, The Destruction of the European Jews, 
exposed the vast bureaucracy mobilized in the destruction of the Jews, as well as the wide cross 
section of Germans employed. As he states:
The bureaucrats who were drawn into the destruction process were not different in their 
moral makeup from the rest of the population. The German perpetrator was not a special 
kind of German. What we have to say about his morality applies not to him specially but to 
Germany as a whole. How do we know this? 
We know that the very nature of administrative planning, of the jurisdictional structure, and 
the budgetary system precluded the special selection and special training of personnel. Any 
member of the Order Police could be a guard at a ghetto or on a train. Every lawyer in the 
Reich Security Main Office was presumed to be suitable for leadership in the mobile killing 
units, every finance expert to the Economic Administrative Main Office was considered a 
natural choice for service in a death camp. In other words, all necessary operations were 
accomplished with whatever personnel were at hand. However one may wish to draw the 
line of active participation, the machinery of destruction was a remarkable cross section of 
55 Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler, Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany (Oxford: Oxford Press, 2001),  257.
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the German population. Every profession, every skill, and every social status was 
represented in it.56
Hilberg’s meticulous work is one of many primary sources for the awareness that so many 
“ordinary” Germans participated in the Final Solution. Though this is still debated, much of the 
recent historical scholarship has strongly illuminated this point with its rich detail on the actual 
mechanics of the Nazi bureaucracy and various other segments of society at the time. As he 
stated and attempted to show, “every segment of organized German society was drawn into the 
destructive work.”57 Furthermore, Hilberg made the terrifying contention that these ordinary 
Germans were not essentially different from any of us, a point Hanna Arendt stressed in her work 
on Eichmann, the common bureaucrat. Lifton described his own internal struggle throughout his 
intensive study of Nazi doctors as he realized, “the disturbing psychological truth that 
participation in mass murder need not require emotions as extreme or demonic as would seem 
appropriate for such a malignant project. Or to put the matter another way, ordinary people  can 
commit demonic acts.”58 Becker explains this chilling insight further in great detail. 
In Ordinary Men, Christopher Browning documented the activities of a specific police 
order battalion in Poland. As Browning pointed out, these were not men specially trained or 
chosen, rather a cross section of predominately lower, middle class police officers who executed 
mass murder of civilians. The men were given an opportunity to opt out of the killings if they 
were not “strong” enough to proceed, but very few took that option, despite the difficulty some 
initially had in shooting men, women and children hundreds at a time. In one testimony, a man 
56 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews  (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), 277.
57 Ibid., 100.
58 Lifton, The Nazi Doctors,  5.
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justified how he would shoot small children because his comrade had just shot the child’s mother 
and he didn’t want the child to live as an orphan. In no cases were there serious repercussions for 
any of the men that opted out. Interestingly, even in testimony years after the war, no one stated 
they opted out due to moral outrage, rather they viewed themselves as too weak or squeamish to 
participate. In many cases, while the men were disturbed by their “duty” in the beginning, they 
acclimated over time.
 As Browning acknowledged, the men were killing Jews who, “stood outside their circle 
of human obligation and responsibility.”59 They adapted to this new morality with amazing ease, 
able to shoot children in the back the head. At no time did any of these men see actual combat, so 
it is hard to say they were brutalized from vicious fighting, they were never fired upon. Becker 
explains how societies mobilize around their vision and mission, a vision that gives meaning to 
its members. Morality is formed around this mission, according to Becker, it is not an innate 
quality. 
Much recent scholarship has detailed the process of how Jews were isolated, legally, 
socially and then physically. Bauman referred to how the Nazis created a hatred for the abstract 
Jew; according to him, the Nazis had to overcome the specific feelings of community that existed 
for a great number of Jews generally well integrated into German society (contrary to 
Goldhagen). He states:
Nazi legislation, propaganda and management of social settings took care to separate the 
one and only “abstract Jew” from the many “concrete Jews” known to the Germans as 
neighbors or workmates; and to cast all “concrete Jews” through exclusion, deportation, and 
confinement, into the position of abstract ones.60
59 Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men, Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland  (New 
York: Harper Collins, 1992), 73.
60 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust,  227.
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Himmler expressed the same concept in more chilling terms when he complained to his men how 
even his most ardent Nazis had a few “decent” Jews they wanted to protect. He said:
The Jewish people is to be exterminated, says every party member. That’s clear, it’s part of 
the progamme, elimination of the Jews, extermination, right, we’ll do it. And then they all 
come along, the eighty million good Germans, and each one has his decent Jew. Of course 
the others are swine, but this one is a first-class Jew. 61
 In Hitler’s Army, Omer Bartov striped away the common misconception that the German 
Wehrmacht was independent from the racial mass killings of the Nazis. In this book he showed 
how the army and the Einsatzgruppen were intertwined.  The German tradition of organizing the 
army into primary units comprised of men from the same districts in Germany so they shared a 
local history and served together over time and built strong bonds was commonly held to be the 
reason the German army held together so well, even in the face of disaster late in the war, often 
fighting to the last man. Bartov documented how the war in the East quickly obliterated these 
primary units and what held the men together was their belief in the Nazi mission. 
Bartov argued that the Nazis cast the war in the East in terms of an ideological, demonic 
struggle, a literal life and death fight to the end, where the future of civilization was at stake. 
Bartov also discussed that one of the things that held the army together was belief in  the Nazis’ 
pseudo-religious mission on behalf of civilization that demanded extreme sacrifice. Both of these 
contentions, which Bartov supported with historical evidence, fit Becker’s framework of the 
significance of the heroic for man.  Many letters from soldiers describe their sacrifice in terms of 
a heroic struggle for purity and goodness, often in nihilistic terms:
61 Ibid., 187.
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I see the whole nation in the process of being recast, in a storm of suffering and blood, 
that will enable us to reach new heights.62
 
Or another typical example:
 We are trying to change the world, hoping to revive ancient virtues buried under layers 
of filth…this operation must be brutal, and if it fails, those of us still alive will be judged 
without mercy…63
One of Bartov’s themes was that the army was not somehow removed from the Nazi agenda, as 
others have argued. All of the historians discussed in this chapter illustrate how the Nazis 
mobilized the major sectors of society around their grand project. Becker’s  point is that is 
exactly why man creates society - to create a system of meaning through an heroic quest that 
defies man’s terror at his insignificance. As Becker elaborated in his work, cultural creations 
become so important because they represent life’s meaning to man. The Nazi’s raised their 
project to literally a life and death struggle, worthy of any sacrifice.  
 While this is certainly not an exhaustive review of recent scholarship, it highlights many 
important works that demonstrate with convincing evidence the degree of mobilization for the 
Nazi project across a cross-section of German society, including the medical profession, the 
army, and the vast governmental bureaucracy. These works are extremely well done, and their 
historical methods are impressive. Nevertheless, the overall understanding of the Holocaust 
could be enhanced by using this evidence in conjunction with work from other fields that might 
illuminate some why the Holocaust happened, not just how it happened. Ernest Becker’s work, 
described below, is one example of work that could be powerfully coupled with the historical 
analysis already completed.
62 Bartov, Hitler’s Army, 117. 
63 Ibid.
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Chapter 4: Ernest Becker and the “Heroic Nazi”
 Ernest Becker was born in 1924 in Massachusetts. Both of his parents were Jewish 
immigrants. He served in the army during WWII and helped to liberate a Nazi concentration 
camp, though he did not address any of his personal history in his books. After his military 
service he attended Syracuse where he completed his Ph.D. in cultural anthropology in 1960. He 
spent most of his academic career at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada. He 
generally avoided specializing in any one social science and wrote about man’s condition in the 
world as a conscious being that is aware of its finite existence and yet able to creatively construct  
meaning through the creation of culture, art, and religion, just to name a few examples, to 
combat his conscious and subconscious terror of death, drawing particularly on Kierkegaard, 
Freud, Wilhelm Reich, Norman Brown, Erich Fromm and particularly Otto Rank, who was a 
close associate of Freud. Partly due to his lack of a specific academic discipline he was largely 
ignored by academics for many years after his untimely death at fifty in 1974, though he is 
increasingly being recognized in Genocide studies and by a school of thought labeled Terror 
Management Theory, which follows his ideas about the impact of man’s inability to cope with 
the terror of death. He provocatively addressed evil as the carnage man is willing to inflict 
resulting from the need to justify his existence and give his life meaning by dedication to some 
seemingly heroic ideology. It is our “heroic” conceptions, according to Becker, that often result 
in so much pain and suffering.
 “Heroic” naturally implies a positive connotation for most, though Becker contends in 
Escape from Evil that man’s greatest evil arises from his need for heroic meaning when faced by 
a limited, finite existence. To accomplish his “heroic missions” man will sacrifice anything. 
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Becker, building on the work of psychologist, Otto Rank, said man cannot deal with his own 
insignificance, he is only too aware of his inevitable death, so he obsesses with demonstrations 
of power that symbolize immortality. Applying Rank and Becker’s work to understanding 
historical change, Robert Jay Lifton, (also the author of Nazi Doctors, discussed earlier), in  
Revolutionary Immortality, Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution offered a 
framework for understanding the potency, violence and appeal of the Chinese reordering of 
society in the context of mass psychology. Lifton proposed the concept of symbolic immortality 
in explaining the Chinese revolution that is applicable to understanding the widespread consent 
of Germans for the Nazi program. Lifton described symbolic immortality as “man’s need, in the 
face of inevitable biological death, to maintain an inner sense of continuity with what has gone 
on before and what will go on after his own individual existence.”64 Lifton’s work detailed the 
compelling attraction to group identity for many in society. He described how people express 
their need for immortality, which is a need for meaning, through a number of modes including,  
biologically, living on through their family, theologically, living on after death, creatively, 
through their works, or through an identification with nature, “with its infinite extension into 
time and space.”65 In the Nazi Doctors, Lifton posited that the Nazi’s ideology, a utopian vision 
of a pure, eternal German Volk, tapped this core need for meaning and historical continuity.  
As Becker described in his work, man uses his imaginative powers to create symbols of 
purity that confer power, just as he creates enemies that represent decay and death whose 
destruction affirms the immortality of the group. Koonz’ work on the creation of a Nazi mortality  
64 Robert Jay Lifton, Revolutionary Immortality, Mao Tse-Tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1976.), 7.
65 Ibid.
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and Bartov’s chronicle of the “mantle of evil” created in the Eastern campaign around the 
Bolshevik/Jew each jive with Becker’s theory, and their examples make it more powerful. 
In Moby Dick, Captain Ahab is consumed by his “heroic” mission to destroy the white 
whale that he imagines represents all evil.  A moral of the novel is the fantasies of good and evil 
man is capable of creating, and the destruction Ahab brings down upon all involved in his 
“heroic” quest.  In a chapter entitled, “What is the Heroic Society?” Becker described the allure 
of the hero and the need for groups to create identity and meaning amidst a threatening world 
where death is certain. He says, the hero:
kills those who threaten his group, he incorporates their powers to further protect his group, 
he sacrifices others to gain immunity for his group. In a word, he becomes a savior through 
blood. From the head-hunting and charm-hunting of the primitives to the holocausts of 
Hitler, the dynamic is the same: the heroic victory over evil by a traffic in pure power. And 
the aim is the same: purity, goodness, righteousness – immunity. 66
Though she is unfamiliar with his work, this is the same theme that Claudia Koonz stressed in 
The Nazi Conscience. Becker devoted an entire book to this dynamic, which could have 
enhanced the specific historical detail Koonz uncovered. 
Anti-Semitism remains such a powerful topic because its most heinous exemplification, 
the Holocaust, occurred in the modern world. For many, the Holocaust represents the depth of 
evil possible in man. In terms of cultural history, the Holocaust is the disappointment of the 
Enlightenment, the final collapse of any remaining confidence in Western progress, and certainly 
the backdrop for a postmodern age of anxiety and nihilism, later confirmed by the failure of 
communism around the world. As one historically reviews the dead resulting from the secular 
ideologies of the twentieth century, either in Hitler’s concentration camps or Stalin’s gulags, both 
66 Becker, Escape from Evil, 150.
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the products of Western scientific thought, one almost yearns for the religious certainty of the 
Inquisition and the Dark Ages of superstition – though the record of killing by religious societies 
is just as bleak. For Becker, history is merely a succession of man creating different societies, 
different cultural symbols of meaning to deal with his fundamental knowledge and fear of his 
own insignificance. Or in other words, Becker saw history as a succession of ideologies that give 
man some purchase over death, a sense of immortality, not some teleological progression which 
many want to see:
History, then, can be understood as the succession of ideologies that console for death. Or, 
more momentously, all cultural forms are in essence sacred because they seek the 
perpetuation and redemption of the individual life...Culture means that which is 
supernatural; all culture has the basic mandate to transcend the physical, to permanently 
transcend it. All human ideologies, then, are affairs that deal directly with the sacredness of 
the individual or the group life, whether it seems that way or not, whether they admit it or 
not.67 
Escape from Evil, Becker’s last work before his death, was his examination of the root 
causes of evil. As if that is not ambitious enough, all of Becker’s work was an attempt to develop  
a systematic approach to understanding man’s condition in the world. Many of the themes and 
explanations that Becker develops in Escape from Evil could use examples from the work done 
by historians on the Holocaust as examples. Prominent in his analysis were discussions of 
scapegoating, society’s need for sacrifice, the nature of social evil, and the psychology of crowd 
behavior.  
Becker describes man in Escape from Evil as an animal, similar to all living organisms, 
that feeds off of other life. As he says, “Darwin so shocked his time-and still bothers ours-
because he showed this bone-crushing, blood-drinking drama in all its elementality and 
67 Ibid., 64.
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necessity…”68 In similar brutal fashion he described the living spectacle that would appear if the 
lifetime consumption of a typical person were presented - flocks of chickens, a herd of cattle, etc. 
As he said, “each organism raises its head over a field of corpses, smiles into the sun, and 
declares life good.”69 At the level of any organism, there exists an almost frantic urge to survive. 
“We are amazed, as we try to club a cornered rat, how frantically he wants to live.”70  The 
difference with man, however, is that he is conscious of the process, he knows what will 
inevitably happen. He is conscious that he will die, that in the end, he is food for worms. 
This is the paradox of the human condition, according to Becker. As an animal, man is 
driven by the same craving to consume, to continue to survive, yet he is conscious that he will 
die. “Wanting nothing less than eternal prosperity, man from the very beginning could not live 
with the prospect of death.”71 As a result, man creates cultural symbols which do not age or 
decay to quiet his fear of his ultimate death; moreover they provide enduring meaning. Man 
creatively erects some immortal purpose that can comfort him, such as God’s purpose for his life, 
duty to family, something to enrich mankind. 
Tolstoy lamented in Confession, “What will become of my whole life…Is there any 
meaning in my life that the inevitable death awaiting me does not destroy?”72 Man, according to 
Becker, does not fear extinction, so much as he fears insignificance (or extinction with 
insignificance – obliteration). This motive, he believed, is the drive behind religion, one of 
mankind’s most culturally unique features. In Becker’s final analysis, all culture is a defense 
68 Ibid., 2.
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 148.
71 Ernest Becker, Denial of Death (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 4.
72 Leo Tolstoy, Confession, 22.
34
against man’s dread of insignificance. All of culture is supernatural, to the extent it is created by 
the mind, and has the same goal, “to raise men above nature, to assure them that in some ways 
their lives count in the universe more than merely physical things count.”73
This creative fantasy of culture is not harmless, however. After setting this background in 
much more elaborate terms, Becker posited that this creation of culture raises the stakes of these 
symbols. Since they represent man’s attempt to overcome his greatest fear, man tenaciously 
defends them. As he states:
Since men must now hold for dear life onto the self-transcending meanings of the society 
in which they live, onto the immortality symbols which guarantee them indefinite duration of 
some kind, a new kind of instability and anxiety are created. And this anxiety is precisely what 
spills over into the affairs of men. In seeking to avoid evil, man is responsible for bringing more 
evil into the world than organisms could ever do merely by exercising their digestive tracts. 74 
The rest of Becker’s book was a discussion on how this is played out in society, which is 
germane to considering the widespread consent to the Nazi program which the previously 
mentioned scholars have documented in their work, but not fully explained. 
 Almost a third of Evil was devoted to analyzing scapegoating and sacrifice, both of which 
Becker traces back to rituals in primitive societies. Drawing on work of Lewis Mumford, Becker 
showed how the predominant form of scapegoating is magical in origin. In the ritual sacrifice of 
a goat in some cultures, the tribe transfers its uncleanliness to the animal which is sacrificed, 
leaving the village clean. While much has been written in sociology journals about the 
scapegoating of the Jews, clearly evident in the Nazi quest for purity, this has not been fully 
integrated with the works of historical analysis.  
73 Becker, The Denial of Death,  4.
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 Guilt is another complex topic of Evil that ran through his work. Becker believed that 
guilt arises out of man’s knowledge that he is basically an animal that will die, yet he aspires to 
be like God. In primitive societies, man watched nature claim other lives as well as provide crops 
and food for his survival. Man has to give back to the Gods in return for these gifts and for the 
fact that he is still healthy while others are consumed as prey. As man succeeds it is a sign that he 
is blessed, even if it is at the expense of others. Even in modern society, Becker believed there is 
this dynamic of competition and the creation of envy because any time one is out-shined there is 
diminishment, which reflects on the individual’s project of immortality, and these symbols are 
psychically imbued with tremendous importance. “Every conflict over truth is in the last analysis 
just the same old struggle over...immortality. If anyone doubts this, let him try to explain in any 
other way the life-and-death viciousness of all ideological disputes.”75 This was evident in the 
way the Nazis literally framed their project into a life or death struggle. 
  Detlev Peukert in The Weimar Republic captures the undercurrent of resistance to 
modernity by elites whose traditional power structures were being overturned. Any power 
structure has almost religious significance for Becker, who traces the rise of kingship 
communities to the modern nation-state. The basis of kingship and the basis of the nation-state 
for Becker is the identification of the people with some transcending belief in immortality (a 
heroic mission, for example that gives their mortal lives meaning) that the leader, or culture, 
represents. As Becker states, “the nation represents victory and immortality or it has no mandate 
to exist.”76 Almost all the historians reviewed touch on the rhetoric of the Nazi vision for a 
racially pure society, the ”thousand year Reich”, the demonization of Jews and Bolsheviks as 
75 Becker, Escape From Evil, 64.
76 Ibid., 117.
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enemies, examples that would fit Becker’s theory and would be interesting to explore within that 
framework. Kershaw and Bartov both documented the “Fuhrer Cult” and their explanations 
would have benefited from an examination of Becker’s theory of man’s need for the heroic. 
 Society, according to Becker, uses sacrifice and heroic endeavors, such as war, to counter 
internal discord, to unite the community and to relieve the society’s guilt. Robert Gellately, (and 
several of the other historians discussed), detailed the positioning of the Jew as an outsider. The 
attacks on the Jews made justice a matter of triumph over an external enemy, much the same as 
war attempts to do. Quoting Mumford, Becker observed the “joyful release that so often has 
accompanied the outbreak of war…popular hatred for the ruling classes was cleverly diverted 
into the happy occasion to mutilate and kill foreign enemies.”77 In Crowds and Power, Elias 
Canetti described how at the outbreak of World War One, Hitler fell on his knees and thanked 
God. “It was his one decisive experience, the one moment at which he himself honestly became 
part of the crowd.”78 One cannot help but notice the religious overtones of the Nuremberg rallies 
with Hitler at the alter, working the crowd as high priest and ruler. This is exactly to Becker’s 
thesis that these cultural creations are by their very nature sacred. 
Primitive man, according to Becker, would subjugate themselves to kings, who 
represented prosperity and immortality because of their success in battle; modern men readily 
gives themselves to the nation-state which, manipulated by politicians, embodies some heroic 
mission. In William Reich’s book, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, he termed these politicians 
“political plague-mongers.” “They are the ones who lied to the people about the real and the 
77 Ibid., 98.
78 Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power  (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1960), 181.
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possible and launched mankind on impossible dreams which took impossible tolls of real life.”79 
As Becker stated, “rapists do not do the damage that idealistic leaders do.”80 
Having an enemy one can overcome demonstrates the heroic mission and is a natural 
manifestation of many societies, according to Becker.  The theory of the German superman (the 
misreading of Nietzsche) had for Becker its basis in the desire for this heroic quest and to 
disassociate man from his animal (mortal) nature. The German was positioned as pure, eligible 
for the heroic life, while the Jews were animals infecting them- a plague. Not surprisingly, the 
Jews were represented as a virus infecting the youth. In some of the infamous pages of Mein 
Kampf, Hitler talked about Jews in alleys who wait for German virgins who they can infect with 
syphilis. 
Freud believed that when it came to strangers and enemies, the ego had no problem with 
the killing of others. “Modern man lives in illusion”, said Freud, “because he denies or 
suppresses his wish for the other’s death and for his own immortality”.81 When others are 
sacrificed, or die, the specialness of the living is validated, according to Becker. He quotes 
Aristotle as saying, “Luck is when the the arrow hits the other guy.”82 War becomes a sacred 
struggle whereby the Gods show who is blessed. Many of the historians reviewed, Bauman, 
Koonz, Hilberg all express almost surprise (understandably) at the ease with which “regular” 
men do demonic acts. 
 
79 Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, 334.
80 Becker, Escape from Evil, 156.
81 Ibid., 109.
82 Becker, Denial of Death, 56.
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On a cultural level, the Jews of Germany, were in some ways different from the general 
public. They had different practices, they sometimes dressed differently, and historically they had 
been separate. In the chaotic, threatening world of Weimar, however, many were thriving. As 
Peukart describes:
The establishment of the Weimar Republic completed the process of Jewish emancipation in 
Germany. The formal and informal barriers which had effectively excluded Jews from 
higher positions in the public service and academic world under the monarchy were 
removed. The Jews now assumed an important part in post-war life, in the liberal parties and 
parties of the left, in universities, and the mass media, and in branches of business, 
especially commerce.83
In one of his most interesting chapters, The Nature of Social Evil, Becker discussed how cultural 
symbols are sacred, they are created out of the fears and needs of man, thus differences can 
convey deeper challenges than might be superficially apparent. He quotes Alan Harrangton, from 
his book The Immortalist:
Cruelty can arise from the aesthetic outrage we sometimes feel in the presence of strange 
individuals who seem to be making out all right…Have they found some secret passage 
to eternal life? It can’t be. If those weird individuals with beards and funny hats are 
acceptable, then what about my claims to superiority? Can someone like that be my equal 
in God’s eyes? Does he, that one, dare hope to live forever too-and perhaps crowd me 
out? I don’t like it. All I know is, if he is right I’m wrong. I think he’s trying to fool the 
gods with his sly ways. Let’s show him up. He’s not very strong. For a start, see what 
he’ll do when I poke him. 84
Nietzsche observed, that “whoever is dissatisfied with himself is always ready to revenge himself 
therefore; we others will be his victims…”85
83 Detlev Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity (New York: Hill and Wang, 1987), 159.
84 Becker, The Denial of Death, 113.
85 Ibid., 115.
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 Browning explained heinous acts by groups of ordinary people as the need for 
conformity. Arendt and Hilberg reference the depersonalization of modern life. Becker has a 
much more elaborate explanation that takes as its starting point the work of Freud in Group 
Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. The simplistic summary of Becker’s thesis in this regard 
it that to individuals all power is sacred; it symbolically represents immortality and some victory 
over insignificance. There is then the heightened sense of power from numbers, the thrill of the 
spectacle that is proof that nature favors such a cause. He also weaves into his crowd theory the 
idea that man views other faces as divine, they are uniquely human, they show the miracle of 
creation and confirm his own heroic destiny. As he states:
This miracle has deep in its eyes and in its head the same beliefs as you, gives you the 
feeling that your very beliefs are supported by natural creation. Little wonder that the 
sight and feel of thousands of such miracles moving together with you gives such 
absolute righteous conviction.86 
This is further supported by Becker’s theory that all men are insecure about their animal nature 
(death) and are searching for transcending symbols, a heroic quest (which often leads to real evil, 
in Becker’s analysis). 
In the final analysis what is so provoking about Becker is his examination of how men 
build meaning through their cultural creations and the “evil” men will perpetrate in defense of 
these immortality symbols. The historians surveyed have chronicled the Nazi “evil” that was 
pervasive in a so called modern enlightened society, without exploring the dynamics. (Evil is in 
quotes because at the time, many viewed the Nazi program as virtuous).  As Becker states, men 
usually kill under a banner of some kind of fight against evil, yet most analysts are then tempted 
86 Ibid., 138. 
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to blame the banner, instead of realizing that, “banners don’t wrap themselves around men; men 
invent the banners.” Germany embraced fascism, and most scholars now believe, and to a fair 
extent have demonstrated, that the great cross section of Germans who embraced the Nazi 
program were not somehow radically different from most others.
A limitation of Becker is that most of his work was stated as theory, without much actual 
evidence. The pairing of Becker’s theory, some of which I have tried to summarize to give some 
sense of its scope, with the rich historical analysis of the Third Reich could be meaningful for 
both understanding the Holocaust and illuminating Becker’s work.  An active debate continues 
about whether the Holocaust was a function of modernity, as Bauman, Millman, and Hilberg to 
some extent believe, or was it fundamentally reactionary, a rejection of progressive modern 
society and a throwback to man’s barbaric ways before civilization. Becker’s explanation of how 
man creates society points to a different understanding of civilization. As Becker states:
If history is a succession of immortality ideologies, then the problems of men can be read 
directly against those ideologies--how embracing they are, how convincing, how easy they 
make it for man to be confident and secure in their personal heroism.87 
Becker, therefore, offers a third option, one reflected in the growing number of scholars who are 
studying the history of genocide, documenting how the phenomenon has occurred throughout 
history.88 They argue the Holocaust may be unique in its characteristics but is certainly not a 
unique phenomenon.  Becker likewise believed the Holocaust is not a function of modernity but 
rather reflects the basic condition of man, a limited animal that cannot accept his own mortality 
87 Becker, The Denial of Death, 190.
88 Mark Levene and other scholars put the number of twentieth century deaths by genocide at 187 million. 
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so is willing to sacrifice the universe, if need be, in the creation of heroic quests that provide him 
some meaning in a finite existence. The Nazis provided one such “heroic quest”. 
Today the public likes to believe that the Holocaust was a function of Hitler, one demonic 
man, or perhaps a function of a core group of evil henchman, outside the normal scope of history, 
without realizing, as Becker would point out, chillingly, that it represents an expression of man’s 
condition. As Becker states, “evolution has created a limited animal with unlimited horizons.”89 
Mark Levene has argued that in the twentieth century alone, “187 million is the figure, the now 
more or less accepted wisdom for the number of human beings killed as a result of political 
violence.”90 Perhaps the Holocaust is not as unique as we would like it to be. 
89 Becker, Escape from Evil, 153.
90 Mark Levene, “Why the Twentieth Century is the Century of Genocide?,” Journal of World History, Vol. II, No. 2 
(Fall, 2000), 305.
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